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The 2013 Cyprus bailout and the Russian foreign direct investment platform 
By Kalman Kalotay
In March 2013, as a new episode of the Great Crisis that 
started in 2008 and whose end is not yet at sight, Eurozone 
members and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) offered 
a €10 billion (about US$13 billion) rescue loan for fellow 
member Cyprus – representing more than half of its gross 
domestic product (GDP). Bailout would come with conditions, 
which will weaken Cyprus’ traditional role as an offshore 
financial centre within the European Union (EU). In the two 
largest banks of the island on the verge of bankruptcy, only 
deposits up to €100,000 (US$ 130,000) were to be saved; 
the rest would disappear of suffer from a huge discount. As a 
symbolic measure, depositors might be offered shares in the 
banks concerned, although their real value would be close to 
nil due to the bad shape of those financial institutions. While 
these were already heavy blows, capital controls required to 
stabilize Cyprus in the short and medium term heralded the 
effective end of the offshore financial centre of the island.  
These developments were bad news for Russian 
investors, which used the island as the most important 
platform for their trans-shipped and round-tripped foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Trans-shipment means FDI destined 
to third countries while round-tripping denotes projects 
targeting the Russian market proper with a detour in Cyprus. 
The phenomenon dubbed Cyp-Rus investment was analysed 
in detail in the context of trans-shipped FDI to other 
economies in transition by the Pan-European Institute a 
decade ago. Since then it has grown in size and in terms of 
targets of trans-shipment, going in reach to developed 
economies. The Bank of Russia estimated the inward and 
outward FDI stocks of the country linked to Cyprus to 
US$129 and 122 billion at the end of 2011 (table 1), 
respectively (it is not by coincidence that the values of the 
two are so similar). They represented 28 and 34% of the 
inward and outward stock of the country. These values were 
five times higher than Cyprus’ GDP. However FDI data 
reported by the Central Bank of Cyprus were way lower, 
begging the question where the difference can be registered 
(such as bank account, real estate, portfolio investment, to 
mention a few possibilities). Official data on portfolio 
investment are not only of little help but also contradictory 
(table 1): Russian statistics show asset growth in crisis years 
while Cyprus data show divestment. As for bank accounts 
held by Russians, statistics are missing; estimated vary 
largely, from €5–10 billion (US$6.5–13 billion, according to 
the Central Bank of Cyprus) to US$31 billion (Moody’s). In 
either case, their size would indicate large losses for Russian 
individuals and firms keeping their assets in the wrong banks 
(the top two: Bank of Cyprus, whose large depositors face a 
severe discount in their assets, and Laiki Bank whose large 
deposits are literally wiped out).  
While Russian investors could probably not foresee the 
degree of measures Cyprus would be forced to engage in, 
the financial crisis had prompted them to think of strategies 
not putting all eggs into the same basket. The most salient 
trend in this respect is the rise of other offshore financial 
centres in Russian inward and outward FDI, especially that of 
the British Virgin Islands (table 1; and to a lesser degree 
Bermuda and the Cayman Islands). Flow data show large 
fluctuations, however. The changing relationship between the 
two top offshore centres is more noticeable in FDI stocks. By 
2011, the ratio between the British Virgin Islands and Cyprus 
rose to an all time high of 44% in inward FDI stocks and 38% 
in outward FDI stocks. 
The Cyprus bailout package can be expected to 
accelerate the shift of Russian corporate strategies to new 
offshore financial centres. It is unlikely that Russian firms 
would change the long-term patterns of their management 
style, and come on-shore in Cyprus or elsewhere. However 
the outward FDI dynamism of the Russian Federation may 
be affected as the potential write-offs related to Cyprus may 
reduce the free resources available for expansion abroad. 
Russian firms can switch activities not only to pure financial 
centres, but also to more mixed trans-shipment hubs such as 
Luxembourg. To what degree these changes would affect the 
size and composition of Russian outward FDI is difficult to 
forecast at this point of time when data series are available 
only until the third quarter of 2012.    
Although the Russian State is in general not in favour of 
offshore finance, it may be obliged to defend Russian 
interests. In the case of Cyprus, it already offered a five-year 
financial assistance of €2.5 billion (US$3.2 billion) to the 
country in 2011, which could be extended until 2021 in case 
of emergency, and may offer case-by-case help to Russian 
firms that suffer disproportionately from the Eurozone rescue 
package. However during the depth of the Cyprus crisis it 
made it clear that it would not engage additional resources 
and by no means would it replace the EU or the IMF as 
leading agencies dealing with the macroeconomic woes of 
the island, nor would it offer any systematic help to the 
Russian business community engaged in Cyprus. 
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Table 1. Inward and outward FDI of the Russian Federation by home/host country, 2007–September 2012 
 
(Millions of U.S. dollars) 
Home/host country Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012a 
Inflows 
Total   54'619 75'201 36'336 43'076 55'615 33'080 
From EU 27 excluding Cyprus 19'525 21'773 12'199 20'696 27'031 23'660 
From British Virgin Islands   3'246 7'341 1'753 2'138 7'196 1'283 
From Cyprus Russian data 10'595 19'555 4'270 12'250 13'569 4'567 
  Cypriot data .. -1'434 197 -611 -120 .. 
Inward stock 
Total   .. .. 378'837 489'256 455'904 .. 
From EU 27 excluding Cyprus .. .. 111'323 148'686 168'015 .. 
From British Virgin Islands   .. .. 36'599 50'966 56'442 .. 
From Cyprus Russian data .. .. 129'930 179'217 128'816 .. 
  Cypriot data .. 2'587 146 773 785 .. 
Outflows 
Total   45'897 55'540 43'632 51'886 67'221 37'499 
To EU 27 excluding Cyprus 17'992 16'694 11'717 18'003 16'511 8'947 
To British Virgin Islands   1'425 3'822 2'305 1'833 4'194 2'646 
To Cyprus Russian data 14'630 8'879 15'391 18'046 22'400 16'110 
  Cypriot data .. 466 641 -372 396 .. 
Outward stock 
Total   .. .. 302'188 365'961 361'738 .. 
To EU 27 excluding Cyprus .. .. 81'093 93'798 110'514 .. 
To British Virgin Islands   .. .. 33'285 38'762 46'137 .. 
To Cyprus Russian data .. .. 119'672 153'933 121'596 .. 
    .. 2'206 1'984 1'491 1'905 .. 
Memorandum items 
Russian portfolio investment flows to Cyprus            
  Cypriot data .. .. -5'817 -544 -20 -1'060 b 
Russian portfolio investment stock in Cyprus            
  Russian data 368 1'366 1'877 2'840 4'633 .. 
  Cypriot data .. 443 1'726 1'517 1'509 .. 
Estimated GDP of Cyprus at current prices 21'769 25'250 23'474 23'000 24'713 22'446 
 
Source: Author's calculations, based on Bank of Russia and Central Bank of Cyprus data. 
 
Note: Data are calculated by the nationality of the immediate investor. 
a January-September 2012. 
b January-June 2012.
